‘How my intuition helped prevent a military escalation’
Kees Matthijssen is a retired Lieutenant General of the Royal Netherlands Army. In *The Subtle Superpower*, you can read in a number of quotes and anecdotes how he still followed his intuition in a rational military environment. He also shared this story, about how he chose a slightly different approach than the orders he had received from ‘on high’.
‘As UN Force Commander in Mali, I chaired the Technical Committee (Comité Technique de Sécurité) that was tasked with overseeing the military aspects of the peace agreement concluded in 2015 between the Malian government and the former warring parties.
In October 2022, I was ordered to investigate a claim by the Malian government. According to them, the CMA (Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad, which represented the Tuareg population in northern Mali and was a party to the peace agreement) had carried out an unlawful troop movement. A large convoy of armed vehicles had been sent from Kidal to Menaka, a city of about 25,000 inhabitants in eastern Mali, which at that time was virtually surrounded by Islamic State. This caused great concern among local authorities and other actors on the ground.
The peace agreement required parties to inform the UN mission MINUSMA in advance about troop movements. It soon became clear to me that the CMA had done so.
Nevertheless, a few days later, the Malian government, displeased, asked the SRSG why MINUSMA had authorized this troop movement. I was asked to put the matter on the agenda of the Technical Committee.
I agreed, but my gut told me that this was not the best approach. Why had the government waited four days? Was there a political agenda behind it? A formal discussion in the committee could escalate the situation rather than resolve it. I did not want to jeopardize the relationship with either party.
So I chose a different route. Instead of putting the issue on the agenda immediately, I first invited the CMA for a bilateral meeting. What I heard confirmed my feeling: there was no intention whatsoever to escalate. The CMA was deeply concerned about the security situation around Menaka and the position of the Tuareg displaced persons. They wanted to take care of their people, simply because they did not trust the Malian government to do so. It confirmed my earlier gut feeling that the CMA was not seeking a military escalation. The troop movement, I concluded, was a political signal. Not a tactical action.
After the meeting with the CMA and bilateral talks with the other parties, I decided to continue discussions with the three parties jointly in a small circle, outside the formal CTS. I called them ‘consultative meetings’ and deliberately not a CTS, in order to keep the nature of the discussions informal for the parties as well. The difference in atmosphere was immediately noticeable. People spoke more openly and freely. After several discussions, we reached constructive agreements, and the parties involved appreciated this approach. I was glad that I had partly followed my intuition in the approach.’
In his book ‘Commandant in vier missies’ (Commander on Four Missions) , Kees Matthijssen shares his personal and military experiences.
